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motivation is, for these emotions, a strong indicator that the emotion itself
is absent. If the individual feels it, nevertheless, the feeling is a sham" (p.
330). I find this puzzling. Why can't someone feel mildly indignant over
some slight, yet remain unmotivated to act, perhaps because of resignation
or forbearance? I would say that such indignation is mildly felt, yet genuine - not a sham.
Readers can judge for themselves the merits of Roberts' positions. Let
me conclude with a final observation. I found several of his examples to be
politically charged and, at times, offensive. For example, in discussing
anger, he tells a (presumably imaginary) story about a colleague suggesting that Roberts be given last choice of upper division courses because
Roberts is
nothing but a middle-aged white protestant male ... " (p.
60). A woman's unusual rage at a man is explained by reference to her
monthly menstrual cycle - this is supposed to illustrate that emotions presuppose a background of normal neurochemical functioning (see p. 134).
Horror is illustrated by asking the reader to consider A wastebasket of
human fetuses, some whole and some in parts ... " (p. 202). He continues:
... it is even more horrifying if one of them is still moving" (p. 202).
Perhaps I am being too sensitive about these examples (my monthly
cycle?), but their content distracts the reader from Roberts' main points,
which could easily have been made using other cases. To me, these illustrations mar an otherwise impressive philosophical contribution.
II

•••

II

II

Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions by Martha C.
Nussbaum. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 751 pages, inc.
index. $39.95, cloth.
GENE FENDT, University of Nebraska
"'Is that what grief is, then?" I said, A malfunction?"'!
II

Upheavals of Thought is as long and varied as a Russian novel. Fortunately,
one does not have to read it straight through for fear of losing track of the
characters. Fruitfully, I took up the assignment of this review at the same
time that I picked up David Lodge's novel, Thinks ... , in which a female novelist, Helen Reed, is dealing, as Professor Nussbaum while writing her
book, with that emotion-lisa excessive, so disproportionate to any possible
evolutionary payoff" (Lodge, 69)-we pin down in the five letters of grief.
Helen Reed faces her grief against a former philosopher entirely transformed into an adulterous director of an AI institute. Martha Nussbaum
faces hers in the company of the Stoics and Proust, Joyce and Whitman,
and against Plato, Dante, Augustine and others. The Lodge novel and the
scholarly book make the reader consider several thought experiments from
quite different angles; the novel performs, the scholarly book represents
and argues; I ruminate: perhaps the scholarly book performs as well ....
Nussbaum's continuing project is to develop and implement what she
calls a "cognitive/evaluative" theory of the emotions (3), a theory which,
accompanied by a flexible notion of intentionality" (129) will show how
II
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emotions "involve judgments ... in which [we appraise] an external object
... [and] we acknowledge our own neediness" (19), fragility, and vulnerability. More specifically, Nussbaum wishes to exhibit and implement the
explanatory value of the thesis that an emotion is "identical with the acceptance of a proposition that is both evaluative and eudaimonistic" (41).
"The real, full recognition [of the event] ... is the [emotional] upheaval"
(45). Since her theory of the emotions is based in a nonlinguistic account of
cognition, I wonder what will count as judgment (and assent or acceptance)-or more exactly what won't count as such; this is particularly problematic given the admission that there are both non-self-conscious and
non-conscious emotions (126). Which of these, then, are or involve judgments: A bat chasing night moths? An ameba fleeing the light on a microscope slide? A thermostat turning on the heat when it is cold? Since what
she means by cognition is "nothing more than 'concerned with receiving
and processing information'" (23), it seems she must allow all of these have
cognitive function; perhaps, then, they also all have emotions? And then,
she adds, "even the best translation [of a judgment into a linguistically formulated cognitive appraisal] an observer can make will involve some
degree of distortion" (127); but how could this distortion be seen, noted, or
cognitivelyappraised? Let us not speak of that.
Her account, the explanation (including its relation to animals), extenuation (into the social and political life) and illustration of which occupy the
first two parts of the book (about 450 pages), she calls neo-Stoic. That label
seems to me to be dependent upon a single (and that much modified)
agreement with the Stoic position that emotions just are value judgments.
Her view seems to be much more in agreement with Aristotle, though
Aristotle is not, to my mind, so absolutely unarguably cognitivist as the
Stoics were or Nussbaum wishes to be. It is tempting to write a review
merely on these classicist retoolings, about which Nussbaum is always
worth consulting and frequently insightful or provoking, or perhaps on the
issues, already adumbrated, which it raises in philosophy of mind. Both
those reviews would be for different journals.
The general underlying idea, that the emotions are, "in effect, acknowledgments of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency" (22), would be agreed
upon by every philosopher in history, though they would differ widely in
their philosophies of mind, in their accounts of judgment and in how the
'acknowledgment' of neediness is effected. However, this basic underlying agreement allows Nussbaum, in Part III, to compare the stories several
artists and philosophers seem to hold about the structure of, and relation of
several other passions to, that master passion and acknowledgment of our
insufficiency called love. The remainder of this review will center on that
last 250 pages, which take their lessons from Plato, Spinoza, Proust,
Augustine, Dante, Emily Bronte, Mahler, Whitman and Joyce.
The book Professor Nussbaum has been wanting to write for some time
is on love; Part III of the present book includes more, and broader, investigation for that book than she has previously published. Naturally, she
must go back to Plato in order to set up her way through the problem,
which is "to examine the cures that have been proposed [for the dangers of
erotic love], to see if they really do the trick of giving us love's energy and

404

Faith and Philosophy

wonder without its [ethical] danger" (461). It is not accidental that the
opening tones of this section of her book repeat the romantic love at first
sight scene of Proust's Marcel and Albertine on the beach, or that she uses
Albertine, irregularly, as an evaluator of the various "recurrent attempt[sl
to reform or educate erotic love" (469). One may, throughout this concluding section, wish for more regularity and specificity of terms on the one
hand, and offer conflicting readings of her 'characters' (Plato, Augustine,
Dante, et al.) on the other. At times these problems overlap.
For example, after a quote from Kant's (pre-critical) Lectures on Ethics
Nussbaum points out that while he uses the term "sexual love" it seems
more accurate to say that he retains both sexual desire (accompanied by
shame) and human love, eliminating sexual love completely from the welllived ethical life" (464, italics original). But it seems that Kant is, even in
the short quote given, being very exact: "taken by itself and for itself [sexual
love] is nothing more than appetite. Taken by itself it is a degradation of
human nature.... Sexual desire is at the root of it" (463, italics mine). In
contrast to the implication of Nussbaum's footnote (463n), Kant's later critical distinction between the practical and the pathological does not, it seems
to me, discount strong emotion of itself, for respect and love of justice
might be so strong as even to overcome the fear of death; the moral issue
for Kant is about the root of the passion-is it the freedom of reason, or the
interest provoked by the lyre-like hips (and the desmesnes that there adjacent lie)? The difficulty that must be faced here (in Kant and in the book at
large) is the question of the connection between substantive (love) and
adjectives (sexual, human). Kant is very clear about how he means to keep
these distinctions. It may be that Nussbaum's neo-Stoic point d'appui will
disallow Kant's distinction at the source, but in any case a book on love
needs to fix the issue.
Nussbaum thinks it "plausible to say that erotic love is inseparable from
some type of sexual desire, meaning by that some kind of desire for intercourse and other bodily acts. This desire need not be conscious, and need
not take the form of an actual plan or project" (476). Though such inseparability is contested by a boatload of Christian writers and Socrates
(though not Aristophanes), she holds that "erotic love cannot be the love it
is without sexual desire" (476). Such a view need not be an entirely 'from
the bottom up' (with double entendre) view of the human being-if other
forms of love are admitted, but it is certainly in accord with modern
Freudian inversions of Diotima's (or Augustine's, or Dante's) more divine
view. One might, for the sake of a common starting point, accept
Nussbaum's "definition of love" as "a particular kind of awareness of an
object, as tremendously wonderful and salient, and as deeply needed by
the self" (477) and then distinguish the kinds of awareness, salience and
need in order to distinguish, say, erotic love from what Kant calls practical
love, or sexual love from parental love, or any of these from the child's love
for the parent or any man's for God. It seems likely, under that definition,
that certain sorts of salience and need imply the project of possession, perhaps even jealous possession; other sorts of awareness and salience require
something else entirely. About such distinctions Nussbaum is, unfortunately, vague.
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If one accepts such a Nussbaumian definition of love and the concomitant way of making the distinctions among loves, then I think it would be
surprising to discover that very many of the sorts of love there are meet
Nussbaum's normative criteria of supporting "general social compassion"
(479) and "mak[ing] room for and support[ing] reciprocal relationships of
concern" (480). Most would "recognize and make central the fact that
human beings are individuals" (480). On the other hand, it seems one of
her complaints against Plato, namely, that the object of his eros has "a certain highly general homogeneity" (487), meets those first two normative criteria quite well. Indeed, it seems her complaint would apply to any view
(e.g. Kant's) which will require love to support general social compassion.
If one stipulates that erotic love cannot be the love it is without sexual
desire, for instance, one should not be surprised to discover that as erotic it is
sans merci; that it is not an "embracing unconditionality" (499), but is (in its
own understanding) "illiberally perfectionist" insofar as it cherishes its
objects in accord with their perceived capacity to provoke or answer sexual
desire. To say, then, that "Platonic thinkers repudiate compassion" or lack
"respect for the dignity and separateness of others" (527), seems less accurate than to say that eros (lmderstood as Nussbaum defines it) does.
Of course, to say such a thing of eros is to come closer to the Kantian
position that taken by itself eros does degrade the person. One might
avoid this problem with a more generous (or divine) idea of eros, as Plato
and Augustine do. Under such a view it will be true that the story of "this
life is not erotic union, but erotic longing, distance, incompleteness" (545),
but for some reason this version of neediness and fragility seems excessive
to Nussbaum. Alternatively, one might temper eros by yoking it together
with a horse of a different color, as Plato in the Phaedrus and Kant do.
Nussbaum also thinks that the Augustinian ascent requires one who has
been in love to blind herself "to that person's beauty and power, ... ciose off
his access to your feelings through habit and memory, and the memory of
habit, and the habit of remembering" (545). But it seems more adequate to
understand Augustine's conversion as being from an eros he forges for
himself in the cauldron of Carthage (following after his own flesh) and so
one in which he deceives himself about what precisely the beauty and
power of the other person is, to an eros for that One for whom he was created in whom only the true beauty of all other things and persons can be
truly seen. This is not an ascent in which the Christian becomes "radically
isolated in her confessional zeal, retreating from the world to be totally
alone with God" (550). Nor is the equality Augustine sees merely "an
equality of abjectness, sinfulness, and need. In our common descent from
Adam, that is to say, in our original sinfulness, is the foundation of our fellowship" (550). Augustine prays not to be purged of affection, or memory,
or nature, but to be purged in these (e.g. Confessions 4.11.17, 4.12.18); our
equality cannot be measured in sin (for sin is a lack), but is in our original
creation as imago dei (e.g., De Trinitate 12 and 14).
I shall close with a few comments about the ascent which "in some
ways" is "the most completely satisfying of all" to Nussbaum, which she
finds in Mahler. If the emotions just are judgments both evaluative and
eudaimonistic, then Mahler's music, as "the creation of a totality of emo-
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tional expression" (615) must be carrying us along on a stream of such
judgments. While Nussbaum does not agree with Deryck Cooke that
music is so language-like that propositions can be formed of it, she does
find it necessary, in explicating Mahler's ascent, to make considerable reference to his three "programs" for the Second Symphony, as well as to personal and social occurrences during the time of its composing. While
telling a story about a piece of music does require some kind of representationalism, just as telling the story about an emotion does, it does not seem
particularly helpful to understand the music itself as representational, or to
think one is understanding it better as music to be able to tell such a story.
If we consider Cooke's analogy, the language of music seems to be (unfortunately for Cooke) all syntax, no semantic. So Nussbaum's suggestion
(against all of Mahler's revised programs) that the symphony is exploring
"the contrast between the expression of the self in society and its purer and
richer expression through solitary personal striving" for which "it is crucial
for it to contain not only the sardonic and grotesque account of society that
the third movement will provide, but also a reminder of society at its
best-... the first movement" (623), gives us a clear and cleverly wrought set
of representations to consider along with the music, but that the music is
about this intentional history in any way seems simply an outrageous
claim. I very much enjoyed Walt Disney's original version of "Fantasia"but the title is telling, and true. Any number of dreams might go along
with this music, but such particularity of intention is fantastic. If the point
of Mahler's ode and the music were to "depict the movements, the very
being, of the striving heart as ends in themselves" (637), something which
"glorifies striving rather than promising the static possession of an object"
(638), one would be tempted to ask of it "striving for what?" But as it is
music, one does not respond to it as if it were a thesis or a judgment.
Perhaps the emotions it elicits are otherwise also.
NOTES
1.

Lodge, David, Thinks . .. (New York: Viking-Penguin, 2001), Pp. 69.

Faith and Narrative, edited by Keith Yandell. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001, pp. 288. $52.00.
KELLY CLARK, Calvin College
Narrative is among the hottest topics in continental philosophy, ethics, literary theory, biblical studies, theology and any number of areas of humanistic concern. The claims of narrativists run from the near-obvious (for
example, history is best understood in a narrative context) to the highly
controversial (the Biblical narrative clearly shows a God who forgets, gets
angry and depends on human agents to accomplish God's purposes), to
the outlandish (the self is a narration). We find narrative everywhere these
days (everywhere, that is, except in analytic philosophy which has not paid

